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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The lower court ruled that the Plaintiff/Appellant had 
not established prima facie case that a contract consisting 
between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendants/Respondents and 
entered Judgment for no cause of action against the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant seeks to tbve the lower coures Judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or shortly before September 30, 1971, Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Ned Gregerson approached Defendant/Respondant 
James Jensen to inquire into the purchase of some land held by 
Jensen in Gunnison, Utah. (Transcript of court proceedings 
hereinafter T) llA:l9-20. Gregerson was interested in 
establishing a dental practice in Gunnison, where he was 
reared. T 10:11,12, 25-30; 28:7-15. 
Contact was first made at the service station that Jensen 
manages in Gunnison. T llA:l9-20; 44:25-26. At that time 
Gregerson and his father tried to talk Jensen into selling the 
land by telling Jensen that they would assist him to establish 
an Amway business which would allow him to retire in five years. 
T 45:1-7,19-24; 46:18-28. 
Shortly thereafter, Jensen and Gregerson went out to 
examine the property in question. T 47:1. Jensen owned only 
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one piece of land in the area. (finding of fact no. 5) 
Jensen's home was located on the southern portion of the lot 
and the northern portion was being used as pasture. T 26:10-14; 
T 38:8-9. Jensen would only consider selling a piece of the 
pasture land, since his drain field and cesspool extended into 
that area. T 46:6-13; 47:2-4. Jensen indicated to Gregerson 
the piece of the pasture land he thought he would be willing 
to sell by kicking the dirt at a spot on the land that he 
presumed to be beyond the point of possible interference with 
his cesspool and drain fields. T 46:6-13. 
Preliminary negotiations ensued at Jensen's home in which 
Gregerson agreed to pay $700 for property to the north of the area 
where Jensen kicked the dirt. T 48:11-19. Jensen was willing 
if Gregerson would establish his dental practice on the property, 
which would enhance the value of Jensen's land, (T 51:17-25) 
and if Jensen was able to get a partial release of the mortgage 
on the whole of his property. T 59:10-lG; 30:2-5; 49:21-22. 
Gregerson at that time gave Jensen a cn2ck ot $350 to hold the 
property, (T 17:23-30) which Jensen deposited in the bank. 
T 60:16-22. The check now appears with the following inscription 
in Gregerson's handwriting "1/2 payment on land as agreed other 
1/2 payment when deed delivered." (Plaintiff Exhibit NO. 1) 
-2-
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Gregerson, at the time of these preliminary negotiations 
was concerned about obtaining a legal description of the 
property. T 15:7-8. Jensen produced a tax notice which 
contained a legal description of the entire piece of property 
owned by Jensen, but no description existed of any divided 
portion of the entire piece. T 15:9-24: 4:23-27. See also, 
Designation of Record on Appeal No. 18. 
Gregerson and his father took the tax notice and later 
went to measure the land along with a local builder, Don Anderson. 
T 38:14-22. Jensen was interested in verfying the description 
on the tax notice to insure that sufficient land was actually there 
to provide for a dental clinic. T 40:29-30; 41:14-26. However 
the depth of the lot to the point where Jensen had kicked the 
dirt was not described in the tax notice. see, Designation 
of Record on Appeal No. 18. 
Shortly thereafter Gregerson returned to the army base 
in Texas where he was sarving in the military. T 20:12-13, 24-25. 
Jensen understood that Gregerson was going to return to Gunnison 
in December of 1971, after he was discharged from the army, to 
complete negotiations and commence construction of a dental 
clinic on the property. T 49:12-15; 51:28-30. During the 
interim period, following preliminary negotiations, the bank 
-3-
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in Gunnison prepared a deed for conveyance of the property 
to Gregerson. T 50:17-29. However, Jensen, on the advise 
of the bank, did not execute the deed prior to Gregerson's 
return in December since no survey had been made of the 
property, T 52:21-31; 51:1-4, and the deed had been prepared 
at the request of someone other than Jensen. T 50:17-19. 
Jensen assumed that the deed was prepared at Gregerson's 
request. T 50:17-19. 
Gregerson, subsequently decided to establish his dental 
clinic in Cedar city rather than Gunnison. T 22:18-19; 
23:1-5. Jensen offered to give Gregerson his money back, but 
Gregerson wanted the money plus interest, and refused Jensen's 
offer. T 51:10-12. 
Gregerson commenced a suit for specific performance of a 
land sales contract, which was tried September 27, 1978. The 
court, after hearing Gregerson's argument, dismissed the claim 
on the basis that there was no description of the land which 
the court could specifically enforce. T 74:14-21; 76:7-12. 
However, the court did order Jensen to return the $350 deposit 
with interest. 
-4-
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Gregerson moved for a new trial on the basis that Jensen 
allegedly failed to reply completely to Interrogatory No. 14 
which asked the following: 
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please state whether 
or not any other written documents exist concerning 
the property described in Interrogatory No. 2 between 
Plaintiff and Defendants which were written or 
prepared on or about September 30th, 1971. If 
the answer to this is in the affirmative, please 
attach a copy of said instrument." 
Jensen's response did not recognize the existence of the 
unsigned deed prepared by the bank. 
"INTERROGATORY NO. 14: ANSWER: In answer 
to Interrogatory No. 14, there are not any documents 
that exist regarding the sale of said property." 
(Designation of Record on Appeal No.8). 
The trial court denied the motion on the following basis: 
"That the existance of an unsigned document not 
prepared by the Defendant would still not make a prima 
:t;acie case for Plaintiff." (Court Order dated 
January 1st, 1979; Designation of Record on Appeal 
No. 24). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DECIDED THAT THE 
CANCELLED CHECK BEARING NO DESCRIPTION OF 
THE LAND TO BE CONVEYED IS NOT A SUFFICIENT 
MEMORANDUM TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
utah Supreme court decisions dated from 1915 have consistentl~ 
held that no memorandum is sufficient to satisfy the Statute 
-5-
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of Frauds unless it contains all of the essential terms of the 
alleged agreement. The cases make it clear that a description 
of the property to be conveyed is one of the essential terms 
required. 
In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P 465 (1915) the 
plaintiff, M. Louisa Adams, as executrix of the estate of 
D.C. Adams, sued to enjoin the continued trespass of the 
defendant, Manning, on lands which had been owed by the decedant. 
At trial Manning produced a receipt which he claimed to have 
received from the decedant. The receipt read as follows: 
"october 19, 1901. Received of H.W. Manning 
thirty dollars $301 as part payment of thirty 
acres of ~and. Pr~ce to be $100 for said land. 
D.C. Adams 
In reversing the decision of the district court the Utah 
Supreme Cour~ held that 
[u]nder all the authorities, the memorandum here 
in question is insufficient to take the alleged 
sale out of the statute of frauds for the reason 
that there is no sufficient or any description of 
the land alleged to be sold. 148 P at 466. 
The memorandum in the Adams case is, if anything, more 
descriptive of the :and in question than is the check in the 
instant case. Although the receipt offered in evidence by 
Manning did not fully describe the land he occupied, it did 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
state that thirty acres were involved. The check in the 
present case makes no mention of either the quantity or the 
location of the land alleged to have been sold. 
In more recent cases the Utah Supreme Court has emphasized 
by repetition that a memorandum must include all the essential 
terms of the alleged contract. 
The court held in collete v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 
P2d 730, 732 (1951) that "the written memorandum which is relied 
on to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential 
terms and provisions of the contract ••• The memorandum must 
show what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that 
some contract was made." Again in Eckard v. Smith, 527 P2d 
660, 662 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme court held that 
Specific performance cannot be granted unless 
the terms are clear, and that clarity must be 
found from the language used in the document. 
In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 
P2d 578, 580 (1952), a case dealing with a lease agreement, 
the same court decided that "[i)t is fundamental that the 
memorandum which is relied on to satisfy the statute of frauds 
must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the 
contract." 
-7-
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After making this abstract statement of law the Birdzell 
decision listed the essential provisions of a lease agreement: 
"First, a definite agreement as to the extent and boundaries 
of the property to be leased ••• " 242 P2d at 580. If a 
memorandum of a lease contract must contain the "extent and 
boundaries of the property," surely a land sale contract would 
be subject to the same requirement. 
In zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319 (Utah 1975) 
the utah Supreme Court considered the question of whether an 
endorsed check was c sufficient memorandum to comply with the 
Statutes of Frauds. 
After signi~1 a :alld written contract in January, 1973 
for the sale of realty the parties allegedly modified the 
written contract by oral agreement. The Plaintiff presented 
an endorsed and cancelled check which bore the handwritten 
notation "as per agreement of 12-8-73" as proof of the 
modification. In holding the memorandum to be inadequate the 
Utah Supreme Court said that 
any such modifying agreement must be sufficiently 
certain and unequivocal in its terms that the 
parties will understand what it is and what is 
to be done under it. Neither the check nor the 
quoted notation thereon make any such recitals and 
they do not meet the re0uirement. 538 P2d at 1322. 
-8-
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Dictum in the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Adams v. 
Manning, 46 Utah 82 148 P 465, 467 (1915) is a further illustration 
of the principle that a cancelled check which contains no 
description of the land in question does not constitute a 
sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. After 
concluding that the receipt signed by Adams was not an adequate 
memorandum because there was "no sufficient or any description 
of the land alleged to have been sold," the court made the 
following statement: 
If it can be said that a contract of sale is established 
in this case, we may meet tomorrow with a case where 
the alleged purchases issued and delivered to the 
alleged vendor a check on which the former wrote the 
words "part payment of ten acres of land," and in 
view that the alleged vendor has _endorsed the check 
and received the money and then has died, the alleged 
purchases produces the check and endorsement, and in 
connection therewith claims he took possession, con-
structive or otherwise, of the land alleged to have 
been sold, and asks and is given specific performance 
if he will pay the remainder of the purchase price 
whatever it may be. What becomes of the Statute of 
Frauds under such circumstances. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT AN UNSIGNED 
DEED WHICH WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE vmEN THE 
ALLEGED LEGAL MEMORANDUM WAS FORMED, WAS 
NOT REFERRED TO IN THE MEMORANDUM, AND WAS 
NOT PREPARED BY THE DEFENDANT, WOULD NOT 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
-9-
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Modern jurisdictions are divided on the question of whether 
an unsigned writing not referred to in the memorandum may be 
used to supplement the memorandum. Some jurisdiction absolutely 
refused to allow an unsigned writing to augment a signed 
memorandum unless the signed statement makes an express 
reference to the supplementary document. See for example 
Irvine v. Haniotis, 208 Okla 1, 252 P2d 470, 472 (1953). 
These jurisdictions will not admit parol evidence to show a 
link between the signed and the unsigned papers. Other 
jurisdictions allow two writings to unitedly form the memorandum 
which satisfies the statute. See for example Grant v. Avvil, 
39 Wash 2d 722, 238 P2d 393, 395 (1952). These jurisdictions 
of the second class require that either parol evidence or an 
express reference establish that the two documents constitute 
one memorandum. 
Even where a signed paper contains an internal 
reference to an unsigned one, almost always some 
parol testimony is necessary to aid in the 
identification. There is ample authority holding 
that it is admissible for this purpose. The words 
of reference need not be sufficient in themselves; 
they are required only to the extent that they are 
necessary to prevent successful fraud and perjury. 
In a case where the court is convinced that there 
is no serious danger of such fraud and perjury, the 
words of reference may be wholly dispensed with 
without violating either the words or the spirit 
-10-
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of the statue. • . If from the documents and the 
supplementary parol evidence the court is not 
convinced that no fraud is being perpetrated, it 
may properly refuse enforcement and throw the 
burden of this result upon the statute of frauds. 
2 Corbin on contracts § 515 (1963) 
Regardless of which approach the court chooses to follow, 
the deed in question is not sufficient to satisfy the Statutes 
of Frauds. Obviously the first alternative bars any use of the 
unsigned memorandum to show that a contract existed. Moreover, 
even if the court adopts the second position, the deed is 
inadequate because there has been no showing that any parol 
evidence exists to prove that the two documents from one 
memorandum. Both Gregerson and Jensen have denied under oath 
that they had anything to do with preparing the deed. T 50:17-29, 
30:19-29. Furthermore, Gregerson has not provided any evidence 
from any source either at trial or in his motion for a new trial 
that would prove that either party intended that the deed 
memorialize a contract between the parties. 
There are no Utah cases that consider the question of 
whether an unsigned writing may supplement a signed memorandum 
and remedy its defects. However, both the Restatement of 
contracts and Williston on Contracts recognize that under 
extraordinary circumstances such a supplement will be allowed. 
-11-
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Nevertheless, neither of these authorities on contract law 
would allow an unsigned memorandum to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds in the present case. 
4 Williston on Contracts §§ 582, 583 (3rd ed 1961) report 
cases that illustrate the liberal doctrine which would allc'rl 
an unsigned document to supplement a signed memorandum. 
Williston criticizes the decisions that have accepted th~ 
liberal doctrine because it nullifies any protection which the 
Statute of Frauds provides: 
It seems difficult to justify this extension of the 
doctrine in regard to several documents. There is 
no difficulty in making out a written memorandum that 
evidently relates to the same transaction, but the 
memorandum is not signed by the party to be charged. 
A simple illustcration will indicate this. A writes 
a letter to B, saying: "I will sell you the property 
of which we spoke yesterday for $5,000 cash." B replies: 
"I understand that you will sell me the following 
described property of which we spoke yesterday 
(describing the property) at $5,000 cash. I hereby 
accept your proposition." According to the doctrine 
here criticized B's reply could be read with A's 
letter to charge A; they evidently refer to the same 
transaction, and the description of the property 
contained in B's letter could be incorporated in A;s 
~riting. But it is obvious that A has never 
authenticated the description by his signature, and 
to allow the description written by B to be used by B 
in enforcing the contract against A, is nothing 
other than to allow B to write an essential term of the 
memorandum himself and charge A with it as written. 
This criticism has particular relevance to the instanc 
case. 
-12-
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If utah law enforced the claims of every purchaser of land who 
had first made partial payment by cancelled check and who then 
relied on a separate deed for the description of the land - a 
deed that was not signed by the grantor, which did not exist 
when the check was delivered, and which was not referred to by 
the check - the opportunity to create a bargain would attract 
innumerable composers of false deeds and allow the almost total 
emasculation of the Statute of Frauds. 
Section 208, comment d, of the Restatement (second) of 
Contracts reads as follows: 
d. Reference to future writings. Ordinarily a 
signature does not authenticate a document not in 
existence at the time the signature is made. But 
when several documents are executed by different 
parties in a single transaction, the signature of 
one may have reference to a subsequent signature 
of another. In some such cases the earlier 
signature may be adopted with reference to a 
document prepared later, whether signed by anyone 
or not. In other cases the reference is to an 
event of independent significance, or to the 
exercise of a power granted by the signer. Thus 
a signed offer authenticates the acceptance invited 
by it. 
Illustrations: 
6. A and B enter into a contract within the 
Statute and sign a memorandum, otherwise sufficient, 
stating that the price to be paid shall be the same 
as the price agreed upon by C and D in a similar 
contract expected to be made on the following day" 
The memorandum is sufficient if it accurately states 
-13-
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the entire agreement between A and B. The 
contract made between c and D is an event of 
independent significance, and may be referred 
to for the price whether or not there is a 
memorandum signed by c or D. 
7. A and B enter into an oral contract for 
the purchase and sale of a tract of land and sign 
a memorandum, otherwise sufficient, stating that 
the contract is "contingent upon A's ability to 
arrange $7,000 purchase money mortgage." A 
subsequently applies in writing to a financial 
institution for such a mortgage loan on specific 
terms as to duration, interest rate and payment. 
The mortgage loan application may be read with the 
memorandum to satisfy the statute against either 
party. 
In the present case if the warranty deed were executed the 
parties to the conveyance would be the same persons that had 
signed and endorsed the check. Moreover, the drafting of the 
deed is not an event of independent significance. Therefore, 
since the deed does not fall under either of the exceptions of 
commend d, the general rule bars the deed because it is a 
document that was not in existence at the time that the check 
was signed. 
Appellant relies on Jacobson v. cox, 202 P2d 714 (Utah 1949) 
and stauffer v. call (Supreme court of the state of Utah, filed 
January 9th, 1979, case No. 15468) to show that the court in the 
instant case ought to arrive at an appropriate description of the 
land for the parties in dispute. 
-14-
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However, in the Jacobson case the land in question was 
described in the original contract by reference to natural 
boundaries and fences such th~t misdescription in the record 
could be easily remedied. The court therefore decided that 
the case should be taken out of the Statutes of Frauds based 
on the following standard: 
A Description is sufficient if when read in the 
light of the circumstances of possession, ownership, 
situation of the parties, and their relation to 
each other and to the property, as they were when 
the negotiations took place and the writing was 
made, it identifies the property. A description is 
sufficient, although vague in respect of the 
boundaries, if it identifies a specific tract of 
land when applied to the facts on the surface of the 
earth, as where a surveyor, with the contract in his 
hands and with the aid of no other means than those 
provided, could go to the place stated therein and 
accurately located the land. A~erican Jurisprudence 
Section 348, Volume 49, Statutes of Frauds, in dealing 
with the subject of uncertainty in deeds states. 
Application of this standard to the contract at hand clearly 
shows that the description did not take it out of the Statute of 
Frauds. The only description on the contract was "land as agreed". 
Could anyone accurately locate the land based on the contractual 
description, as the standard requires? Moreover, if the land 
were described in the contract it would have to be described with 
reference to the unmarked spot where respondant kicked the dirt 
some eight years ago. 
-15-
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Appellant, Gregerson, also relies heavily on the case 
Stauffer v. Call (Supreme court of the State of utah, filed 
January 9th, 1979, case No. 15468) to establish that the 
warranty deed in the present case satisfies the Statutes of 
Frauds. 'l'he Stauffer casE;!·· is irrelevant for that purpose. 
Specific performance was decreed in the Stauffer case because 
the Plaintiff's part performance (possession and improvement) 
took the case out of the Statute of Frauds. The court made 
no holding that the statute was satisfied. 
"They [plaintiffs] made as sellers concede, substantial 
improvemeRts to the two houses in which they lived 
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 
towards the full price takes ~he matter out of the 
statute of frauds." 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ACTS OF PART PERFORMANCE 
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO REMOVE THE ALLEGED 
CONTRACT FROM THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
In the case of Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah ·205, 293 P. 7,10 
(1930) the utah Supreme court enunciated bhe elements of a 
prima facie case of part performance as follows: 
The law is well settled in the state that, 
before a court can decree specific performance 
of an oral gift of land, it must appear by 
evidence that is clear, convincing, and 
unequivocal: 
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(l) That there was a parol grant or gift £y 
a contract or agreement which must be complete 
and certain in its terms; 
(2) possession taken and improvement, made by the 
donee pursuant to and in reliance on such oral gift; 
(3) that the improvements so made are substantial ••• 
(4) strong equities in favor of the donee, so strong 
that it would amount to a fraud upon him to allow 
the statute to be interpreted to defeat his claim. 
293 P. at 10 
Although the concise Boland summary came from a case which 
involved an oral gift of land rather than an oral contract, 
holdings from other Utah Supreme Court decisions (presented 
below) combined with the language of element number one of the 
Boland test above (parol grant or gift by a contract or agree-
ment) conclusively show that the same four requirements apply 
to oral contracts as well. 
The recent supreme court opinion in the case of Holmgren 
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P2d 611 (Utah 1975) reiterates the 
first requirements of the Boland test; that the terms of the oral 
contract must be complete and certain. The court held that "the 
oral contract and its terms must be clear, definite, mutually 
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite 
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality." 534 P2d at 
614. See also Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 523, 125 P2d 413 
(1942). 
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Other Utah Supreme court decisions have held that the 
Plaintiff who seeks specific performance of an oral contract 
must "establish the terms thereof with a greater degree of 
certainty than is required in an action at law." Clark v. Clark, 
74 utah 290, 279 P 504 (1929). See also christensen v. 
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P2d 101 (1959). Since legal 
enforcement of an oral contract for the sale of realty is not 
available in Utah. Baugh v. Darley, 112 utah 1, 184 P2d 335 
(1957): McKinnon v. Corporation, Etc., Latter-day Saints, 529 
P2d 434 (Utah 1974), plaintiffs must establish the oral 
contracts with the "greater clarity" which the clark and 
Christensen cases require in order to qualify for any judical 
remedy. 
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P2d 570 (1953) 
Chief Justice Wolfe explained the requirements of possession 
and the substantial improvements as follows: 
Some jurisdictions hold that possession is an 
indispensible element, while others indicate 
the possession is only ordinarily necessary .••• 
We do not pass on this point. However, assuming 
acts in the nature of general improvements are 
sufficient without the element of possession, 
when it is lacking this court must be convinced 
that no reasonable doubt exists as to whether or 
not the acts of improvement are explainable on some 
basis other than the hypothesis of an oral contract. 
260 P2d at 580. 
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one year after Ravarino the Utah Supreme Court made it 
clear that possession and improvements are part of a prima 
facie case of part performance in utah. The opinion of the 
court in Roth v. Roth, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P2d 278, 281 held that 
"acts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the 
contract in that the possession of the party seeking specific 
performance and the improvements made by him must be reasonably 
explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists ••• " 
The record of the instant case contains no evidence that 
appellant ever took possession of the Jensen land or that he made 
any improvements on the land whatsoever. 
The utah Supreme court opinion in Madsonia Realty co. v. 
zion's Savings Bank & Trust co., 123 Utah 327, 259 P2d 595 (1953) 
reiterated the fourth requirement listed in Boland; that the 
equities of the alleged parol contract so favor the promisee 
that he would be defrauded if the Statute of Frauds barred his 
claim. The court concluded that 
part performance which will avoid the statute of frauds 
may consist of any act which puts the party performing 
in such a position that non-performance by the other 
would constitute fraud. 259 P2d at 602. 
More recent Supreme court decisions have held that the mere 
refusal of alleged promise to perform an alleged oral contract 
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cannot constitute the fraud which is necessary. In Easton v. 
Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P2d 332, 335 (1956) the Court 
decided that 
A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement within 
the statute, however is not such fraud as will 
justify a court in disregarding the Statute even 
though it results in hardship to the plaintiff ••• 
And that mere loss of a good bargain is not enough 
to estop defendant from setting up the statute of 
frauds as a defense to an action on a contract. 
The same court's opinion is McKinnon v. Corporation, Etc. 
Latter-day Saints, 529 P2d 434, (Utah 1974) held that 
Fraud, generally cannot be predicated upon the 
failure to perform a promise or contract which 
is unforceable under the statute of frauds, for 
the promisor has not, in a legal sense, made a 
contract; and therefore, he has the right, both 
in law and in equity to refuse to perform. 
Since the trial court in the present case has already held 
that the appellant will receive a repayment of his down payment 
with interest, there is no loss which he will suffer other than 
the loss of his bargain. 
The decision of Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Utah 435, 237 P 1097, 
1103 (1925) is one illustration of facts which state a prima 
facie case for part performance of an oral contract. In that case 
the Utah Supreme Court held that 
The written contract, as modified by the oral agree-
ment, is definite, certain, and specific in all its 
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terms. It constitutes a valid contract for the 
purchase of the east half of the land in question. 
Plaintiff paid the full purchase price, and with the 
knowledge and consent of the vendors, entered into 
possession and made valuable improvements thereon. 
The facts of the instant case differs from those in Hogan 
and fall short of the requirements of Boland in that 
( l) 
( 2) 
land 
(3) 
(4) 
The parol agreement is not clear. 
Appellant did not take possession of the 
in question at any time. 
Appellant made no improvements on the land. 
Appellant will not be the victim of any fraud 
if the contract is not enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P2d 811 (Utah 1972), the Utah 
Supreme court defined the appellant's burden: 
(d]ue to the advantaged position of the trial court, 
in close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, 
there is indulged a presumption of correctness of 
his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they were in error; and where the 
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings 
merely because we may have reviewed the matter 
differently, but do so only if evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against them. 495 P2d at 812. 
Gregerson failed to meet the burden for the following 
reasons: 
l. Under well established Utah law a cancelled check 
',hich contains no description of the land involved cannot 
constltute a sufficient memorandum of a land sales contract to 
sotjsfy the Statute of Frauds. 
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2. The existence of an unsigned deed not prepared by the 
defendant, not referred to in the alleged memorandum, and not in 
existence when the contract was allegedly entered, could have 
no bearing on the outcome of this case. 
3. Without taking possession of the land or making any 
improvements on it, partial payment under an alleged land sales 
contract does not constitute partial performance sufficient to 
remove the alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds. 
Therefore, the trial court appropriately dismissed the 
plaintiff's cause of action and denied the motion for a new 
trial. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 1979. 
submitted, 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 
JAMES L. JENSEN and NEDRA 
JENSEN, his wife 
P. o. Box U 
29 south Main Street 
Brigham City, utah 84302 
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